M.S. Defense – Fanghui Liu

Major Advisor: Laurent Michel

Associate Advisors: Alexander Russell, Benjamin Fuller

Title: A Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES Using CP

Date: Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 12:00 PM

Location: HBL 1947 Conference Room

Abstract:

AES is a mainstream block cipher used in many protocols and whose resilience against attack is essential for cybersecurity. In [1], Oren et al. discuss a Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Analysis (TASCA) and show how to use optimization technology to exploit side-channel information and mount a computational attack against AES. This thesis revisits the TASCA attack and the results published earlier in the conference paper [2] shows that Constraint Programming is a strong contender and a potent optimization solution. It extends bit-vector solving as introduced in [3], develops a CP and an IP model and compares them with the original Pseudo-Boolean formulation. The empirical results establish that CP can deliver solutions with orders of magnitude improvement in both run time and memory usage, traits that are essential to potential adoption by cryptographers. 

[1] Oren, Y., Wool, A.: Side-channel cryptographic attacks using pseudo-boolean optimization. Constraints 21(4), 616-645 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10601-015-9237-3

[2] Liu, F., Cruz, W., Ma, C., Johnson, G., Michel, L.: A Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES Using CP, pp. 189-205. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66158-2_13

[3] Michel, L., Van Hentenryck, P.: Constraint satisfaction over bit-vectors. In: International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming-CP 2012. pp. 527-543. Springer (2012)